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Chapter 1
Post Crisis Lessons For  Open Economies : Are They 
All New? 1
Istvan Magas
Abstract: This paper will argue that the American economy could and will 
absorb the recent shocks, and that in the longer run (within a matter of years), it 
will somehow convert the revealed weaknesses to its advantage. America has a 
long record of learning from its excesses to improve the working of its particular 
brand of capitalism, dating back to the imposition of antitrust controls on the 
robber barons in the late 1800s and the enhancement of investor protection after the 
1929 crash. The American economy has experienced market imperfections of all 
kinds but it almost always has found, true, not perfect, but fairly reliable regulatory 
answers and has managed to adapt to change, (e. g. Dodd-Frank Act on fi nancial 
stability). The U.S. has many times pioneered in the elaboration of both theoretical 
and policy oriented solutions for confl icts between markets and government to 
increase economic welfare (Bernanke, 2008, p. 425). There is no single reason why 
it should not turn the latest fi nancial calamities to its advantage. At the same time, to 
regain confi dence in capitalism as a global system, global efforts are indispensable. 
To identify some of the global economic confl icts that have a lot to do with U.S. 
markets in particular, we seek answers to global systemic questions.
Keywords: Global fi nancial imbalances, International wealth position, Fx-risk 
exposure, Key currencies
1  An earlier, shorter version of this paper was published in Köz-Gazdaság, Vol. 14, 4.  2011. 
Some of the points and the conclusion have been redrafted refl ecting the discussion held in the 
International Competitiveness Section of the Chinese-European Cooperation for Long-term Sus-
tainability, Nov 10-11, 2011 BCU, Budapest. The author is thankful to all discussants. All remain-
ing errors are his.
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Introduction
The credit crisis was certainly not one of those “forecastable” events. If we ask 
why economists failed to predict the credit crisis, we should also ask why political 
scientists failed to predict the recent Arab Spring, or a terrorist event like 9/11, or 
why seismologists cannot predict earthquakes.                                                          
                                                      Raghuram Rajan
In a systemic perspective, what are the primary transmitters of global 
competitiveness with the proper coordination mechanism? What are the systemic 
impacts of the U.S. economy on world markets? Will the United States stay the 
main engine of world economic growth for quite sometime to come, or at least in 
the current decade? Will and should the United States, as the single largest open 
economy of the world, be in some way responsible for the provision of global 
economic stability as a valuable public good?  Was the recent crisis predictable? 
These are the main questions addressed in this paper, all of which are answered in 
a new global context, and the responses are based on some known principles of 
international economics and economic history.
The American economy, the European Union and with it Capitalism in general, 
have had serious troubles lately. Not, with luck, as serious, as in 1929, when a 
stock market crash on Wall Street set off the global Great Depression, but serious, 
nonetheless. In a longer perspective, 2001-2011   might come to be seen as the  10 
years -when  after two decades of mostly unbroken progress-  capitalism gave way 
to something more ambiguous and uncertain. U.S. corporate governance, capitalism 
American style has received a lot of criticism. But, after all, we believe, it is human 
behavior that can be blamed for the troubles and not capitalism in general. In this 
sense, the above cited words of Fed chairman, Alan Greenspan most properly 
encapsulate the story of the recent evaporation of enormous amounts of wealth. 
The decade of 2001-2011 were the fi rst, perhaps since the start of America’s great 
equity bull market in 1982, when the U. S. and the world became signifi cantly less 
wealthy. 2 
2  Total global marketable wealth-that is, all assets traded in the fi nancial markets, such as shares 
and bonds, fell by almost 40% over the last ten years, according to a study by the Boston Consulting 
Group. The number of households with at least $250,000 of marketable wealth dropped from 39 
million to 37milion.Forrás: www://quote.Bloomberg.com/newsarchive, For a more detailed analy-
sis of the  changing wealth positions of different countries and world economic regions as reported 
by World Wealth Report, 1.6 trillion (1600 billion worth of  fi nancial assets  evaporated only in the 
U:S markets  alone.
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The capitalist system, the American economy and the international fi nancial 
markets in general, however, have proved surprisingly robust in the face of recent 
crises. They have shown their muscles and also their willingness to adapt to change. 
But, if they are to keep their strength, there should be some systemic changes 
and indeed global efforts are to be made. 3 After the severe blows dealt to the 
trust and values of American capitalism, one wonders whether the U.S. economy 
will preserve its dominant world economic position, and whether it will stay an 
attractive place to invest. In many countries, experience calls the American model 
into question in any case. 
This paper will argue that the American economy could and will absorb the 
recent shocks, and that in the longer run (within a matter of years), it will somehow 
convert the revealed weaknesses to its advantage. America has a long record 
of learning from its excesses to improve the working of its particular brand of 
capitalism, dating back to the imposition of antitrust controls on the robber barons 
in the late 1800s and the enhancement of investor protection after the 1929 crash. 
The American economy has experienced market imperfections of all kinds but it 
almost always has found, true, not perfect, but fairly reliable regulatory answers 
and has managed to adapt to change, (e. g. Dodd-Frank Act on fi nancial stability). 
The U.S. has many times pioneered in the elaboration of both theoretical and 
policy oriented solutions for confl icts between markets and government to increase 
economic welfare (Bernanke,2008, p. 425). There is no single reason why it should 
not turn the latest fi nancial calamities to its advantage. At the same time, to regain 
confi dence in capitalism as a global system, global efforts are indispensable. To 
identify some of the global economic confl icts that have a lot to do with U.S. 
markets in particular, we shall seek answers to the following questions.
In a systemic perspective, what are the primary transmitters of global 
3  The most awful shock of 2001 was the terrorist attack on September 11th.
 The fi nancial system stood up to it remarkably well. A lot of credit was due to the central banks 
and to the IMF itself, the pledge made by Hörst Köhler, IMF chairman of the Board, right after the 
disaster „There is commitment to ensuring that this tragedy will not be compounded by disruption 
to the global economy, our central banks will provide liquidity to ensure that fi nancial markets op-
erate in an orderly fashion” has entirely been lived up to (IMF Survey, Vol. 30. No.18, September 
17. 2001. p.1). Moreover, both the American economy and, more broadly, the world economy have 
rebounded much more strongly than anybody dared hope. Yet the attacks proved that even where 
capitalism is well established, it is increasingly vulnerable to those who hate it. No amount of suc-
cess in the current war on terrorism will eliminate this hideous new risk, which is impossible to 
quantify. “ 7 years later, John Lipsky remarked in his speech at John Hopkins University, Towards 
a Post Crisis Economy, re-emphasized the same principle saying “these reforms can only be suc-
cessful if they rest on the principles of  free markets “ www.imf.org /esternal/speeches/2008/111708. 
htm 
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competitiveness with the proper coordination mechanism? What are the systemic 
impacts of the U.S. economy on world markets? Will the United States stay the 
main engine of world economic growth for quite sometime to come, or at least in 
the current decade? Will and should the United States, as the single largest open 
economy of the world, be in some way responsible for the provision of global 
economic stability as a valuable public good? We offer affi rmative answers to these 
questions.
Macro Eonomic Principles as Points of Departure
A./ The underlying framework of analysis in the paper relies on some standard 
propositions of open macroeconomics. Krugmann-Obstfeld (2000, 2003, pp. 344-
377) However, in our discussion we shall use these propositions as basic principles 
that may be subject to varying interpretations as function of a changing domestic and 
global environment. We consider both individuals (consumers and investors), fi rms 
and government as economic agents who are ready to learn from past and recent 
experience, ones who are willing to change their behavior as circumstances change. 
In this perspective, we believe in the “evolution“ of both economic principles, 
describing relevant economic behavior, and in the adoptive learning capacity of 
economic agents. Thus, we do not subscribe to the idea that fi xed, atemporal laws 
are capable of precisely capturing and forecasting future (or expected) patterns of 
economic behavior. 
B./ We hasten to add, nonetheless, that the indispensable virtues of 
model-based, rigorous analysis in advancing economic theory are to be fully 
recognized by the author.  In addition, we acknowledge that the signifi cance of 
the requirement for the appropriate quantifi cation of the outcome of economic 
events, and more importantly, the need to develop the capacity to forecast events, 
with a reasonable margin of error, cannot be overestimated. But it may not be 
overlooked that, to a large degree, the outcome of many fundamental economic 
decisions, whether individual-, fi rm- or government-related are based on people’s 
beliefs and expectations about the future. This is especially the case on the global 
asset markets and on foreign exchange markets that move tremendous amounts 
of money with a lot of lagged real effects. On these markets, people are playing 
against people (and central banks) that value assets on the basis of their feelings 
about the future In our age, fl ooded with information, these feelings, at best, are 
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largely unstable.4 Thus, trying to understand human behavior – which, is always 
subject to change as circumstances change, and incorporate that into economic 
analysis, is perhaps a genuine and valuable effort.
C./ It is an important point of departure that the U.S. economy, against the rest 
of the world, is still very large and the dollar continues to be the most important 
currency in international fi nancial markets. Therefore U.S. policies are markedly 
more important - save the common policies of the euro-zone, Eu-17, and EU-27 - 
than any other country for the evolution of the world economy. Because the U.S. 
economy has become more open, the foreign repercussions of U.S. policies are 
signifi cant today not only for their impact on other economies but also for their 
infl uence at home. Because the other leading OECD economies have become 
substantially larger, and the EU-27 especially has graduated to be on a par in every 
sense of economic potential (output and resources in general), their policies effect 
the U.S. economy and the whole world economy more strongly than any time 
earlier.
D./ Under these circumstances, the U.S. policy makers must pay  more attention 
to the international situation for national as well for global reasons. Furthermore, 
the governments of the other major industrialized nations must be viewed as a 
small group of economic actors whose decisions are truly interdependent and 
important jointly for the world economy. Thus, sub-optimal policy choices are 
likely to emerge in this sort of situation, and all countries can be hurt. In other 
words, the situation calls for policy coordination and for international supervision.5 
In this sense, global mistakes can be worse than national mistakes. 
E./ Governments engage in frequent consultations, exchanging information 
about national policies and comparing economic forecasts, and these routine 
activities can and do lead to better policies by reducing uncertainty domestically and 
4   This, of course, is not a new dilemma on asset (especially on stock) markets, but the IT revolu-
tion has brought about new dimensions and twists to reckon with. 
5  In principle, one should add, coordination can also have perverse effects, when it is conducted 
under great uncertainty about future outlook. Why is small-group behavior likely to produce sub-
optimal policy outcomes? Suppose there has been a worldwide recession. No single country may 
be able to recover on its own by expanding its money supply or taking other measures to stimulate 
demand. It runs the risk of getting ahead of the rest and facing a balance of payment defi cit or seeing 
its currency depreciate if has a fl oating rate. An increase in domestic demand will raise its imports, 
and it can experience a capital outfl ow, too, especially if the increase in demand is engineered by 
monetary policy. When governments act jointly, by contrast, they may be able to avoid unsatisfac-
tory outcomes. If each government agrees to generate some homegrown demand, by proper policy 
measures, each can hope to benefi t from the other’s efforts, and can all count more fi rmly on com-
plete recovery.
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globally. In this sense, improving the global economic outlook can be considered as 
a public good that offers global benefi ts. This reasoning would follow the analogy 
of the public good concept of the international fi nancial stability, a concept fully 
recognized by now. In light of the recent global concerns, both in terms of global 
growth patterns and in regard to increasing uncertainty on international fi nancial 
markets, this line of reasoning should get more attention. Keeping these global 
concerns in mind, we shall review some of the impacts that the U.S. economy has 
generated by its domestic economic events and has channeled them through its 
global links to world markets. The paper will be structured as follows.
First, as part of the introduction, we shall review the markedly changed world 
economic environment and its outcomes on the U.S. roles in the international 
division of labor. In section 1, we shall examine the changing international debt 
position of the U.S. economy as global link-1. Then, in section 2, we shall discuss 
some reborn concerns of the business cycles and the responses to it. In section 3 we 
shall survey some recent developments of fi nancial market regulation which were 
generated in the U.S. economy but have rapidly spread to global fi nancial markets, 
too. Section 4 provides a summary and a fi nal conclusion.
A Markedly Different International Economic Environment
Classical and neo-classical trade theories have established benchmark 
values in economic thinking and they must have their respective chapters in all 
economics textbooks.6 However, they are increasingly irrelevant to the analysis 
of businesses in the countries currently at the core of the world economy: the 
United States, Japan, the nations of Western Europe, and, to an increasing extent, 
the most successful East Asian countries. Within this advanced and highly 
integrated “core” world economy, differences among corporations are becoming 
more important than aggregate differences among countries.7 Furthermore, the 
increasing capacity of even small companies and countries to operate in a global 
perspective makes the old analytical frameworks often  obsolete, (Csaba, 2005, 
2009).
6  The pioneering works of Prof. Mátyás have provided a solid guarantee to this early in the Hun-
garian literature (Mátyás, 1973, 1992, 1996) 
7   For countries of the semi-periphery with respect to current global trends, there are a lot of new 
developments to account for, and renewed distinctions to be made, for a recent work surveying 
theses developments, see Rodrik (2007), Kozma (2002).
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Not only are the “core nations” more homogeneous than before in terms of living 
standards, lifestyles, and economic organization, but their factors of production 
tend to move more rapidly in search of higher returns. Natural resources have lost 
much of their previous role in national specialization Rodrik (2007), (Bhagwati, 
2004, pp. 128-130), as advanced, knowledge-intensive societies move rapidly into 
the age of artifi cial materials and genetic engineering (Nováky, 1999). Capital 
moves around the world in massive amounts at the speed of light, increasingly, 
corporations raise capital simultaneously in several major markets. Labor skills 
in these advanced countries no longer can be considered fundamentally different; 
modern and ongoing training has become a key dimension of many joint ventures 
between international corporations. Technology and “know-how” are also rapidly 
becoming a global pool. Trends in protection of intellectual property and export 
controls clearly have less impact than the massive development of the means to 
communicate, duplicate, store, and reproduce information.8 
Against this background, the ability of corporations of all sizes to use these 
globally available factors of production is a far bigger factor in international 
competitiveness than broad macroeconomic differences among countries. In effect, 
the traditional world economy in which products are exported has been replaced by 
one in which value is added in several different countries and the notion of national 
competitiveness has gone through a dramatic change Rodrik (2007), Bhagwati 
(2004) , Krugman (1994).
At the moment, the United States has some peculiar but signifi cant competitive 
advantages. For one thing, individualism and entrepreneurship-characteristics that 
are deeply ingrained in the American spirit- are increasingly a source of competitive 
advantage, as the creation of value becomes more knowledge-intensive. When 
inventiveness and entrepreneurship are combined with abundant risk capital, 
superior R&D efforts and budgets, and with an infl ow of foreign brainpower, it is 
not surprising that since the mid-1980s, U.S. companies - from Boston to Austin, 
Silicon Alley to Silicon Valley - dominate world markets in software, biotechnology, 
internet-related business, microprocessors, aerospace, and entertainment.9 Also, 
U.S. fi rms are moving rapidly forward to construct an information superhighway 
and related multimedia technology, where as their European and Japanese rivals 
face continued regulatory and bureaucratic roadblocks. The American economy 
provides ample opportunities for profi table investments. Little wonder that 
8  These new tendencies that give new opportunities to trade have been recognized and surveyed 
for large, as well as for small countries, early on,  Kádár (1979), Csaba (1984), Simai (1994), Csaba 
(1994, 2005, 2009), Szentes (1999), Török (1999), in the Hungarian literature, too. 
9  For empirical evidence explaining the early breakthrough of U.S. High-tech industries in an 
imperfect competition framework by some new factors of competitiveness, see Magas (1992).
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throughout the last two decades the U.S. economy has been receiving continuous 
and large dozes of foreign (investment) capital. Foreigners like to invest in the 
U.S. But there are some other, maybe, less obvious reasons that explain why 
the American investors’ money gets external support. Of course, the excellent 
opportunities, the big attraction of returns far exceeding normal profi ts have, at 
times, lead to excesses, to misuse of funds, as well to outright frauds. We have been 
hearing lately more of the latter in connection with the revealed questionable ethics 
of some large fi rms of the élite corporate America. Yet, we shall argue that the 
strength and the attractiveness of U.S. markets will, very likely, remain (even with 
the largely uncertain global outcomes of the ongoing war against Afghanistan). 
The two prime transmitters of competitive forces in the global economy are the 
multinational corporations and the international capital markets. What differentiates 
the multinational enterprise from other fi rms engaged in international business is the 
globally coordinated allocation of resources by a single centralized management. 
Multinational corporations make decisions about market-entry strategy; ownership 
of foreign operations; and production, marketing, and fi nancial activities with an 
eye to what is best for the corporation as a whole. The true multinational corporation 
emphasizes group performance rather than the simple aggregated performance of 
its individual parts. In this sense, the multinational companies can set standards 
globally for the effi ciency targets of the leading fi rms in the industry. The growing 
irrelevance of borders for corporations will, at the same time, force policymakers 
to rethink old approaches to regulation. For example, corporate mergers that 
once would have been barred as anti-competitive might make sense if the true 
measure of a company’s market share is global rather than national. In general, 
the multinational fi rm is effi cient and mostly successful in allocating resources 
with well defi ned global goals. One cannot argue that national economies and their 
governments can claim to have such goals. On the contrary, their coordination and 
resource allocation efforts are serving purely domestic needs. 
In the Hungarian literature it has been also known and extensively analyzed for 
quite sometime, Kádár (1979), Inotai (1989), Lőrincné Istvánffy-Lantos (1993), 
Palánkai (1999), that global economic forces and international economic integration 
also reduce the freedom of governments and central banks to determine their 
own economic policy. At the same time, globalization and integration do enlarge 
the room for companies to foreign investments and multinational operations in 
general. Yet, the desire for making national economic policy choices does remain. 
If a government tries to raise tax rates on business, for example, it is increasingly 
easy for business to shift production abroad. Similarly, nations that fail to invest in 
their physical and intellectual infrastructure (roads, bridges, R&D, education) will 
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likely lose entrepreneurs and jobs to nations that do invest. Capital - both fi nancial 
and intellectual - will go where it is wanted and stay where it is well treated. In 
short, economic integration and the free fl ow of capital are forcing governments, 
as well as companies, to compete. Through sending the right price signals 
international fi nancial markets are becoming good, yet not perfect, mediators to 
investors worldwide to vote with their moneys – and let them invest in economies 
and companies that perform best globally.
As markets become more effi cient, they are quicker to reward sound economic 
policy-and swifter to punish the profl igate. Their judgments are harsh and cannot 
easily be appealed. True, as markets become more global and there is enhanced 
mobility of the factors of production, knowledge and information, unseen types 
of market imperfections emerge, and with that new dilemmas are created for 
regulators, both domestic and international. The global fi nancial markets for 
instance have been especially innovative in creating new complexities and risks 
that were tough matches to both under-informed investors and regulators, domestic 
and international alike. The American securities markets, along with the tightly 
knit international capital markets have produced a good deal of crises in the last 
two decades but none of them led to globally dire consequences or – as of yet - to 
a global recession. That it has not happened, both the self-regulatory mechanisms 
of markets and the swift and astute, yet mostly coordinated actions of fi nancial-
market regulators can be credited. For good market performance -among other 
things- we need effi cient markets, good rules, and, of course, determined; yet not 
over-ambitious regulators that have a powerful bite, nonetheless. Between crisis and 
resolution, however, is always uncharted territory, with the ever-present potential 
of panic feeding on itself and spreading from one nation to another, leading to 
global instability and recession. What we can say about markets, however, is 
that they are, to a large extent, self-correcting; unlike many governments, when 
investors spot problems, their instinct is to withdraw funds, not add more. At the 
same time, if a nation’s economic fundamentals are basically sound, investors will 
eventually recognize that and their capital will return. As a general rule, however 
governments and regulators learn, too. True, they learn slowly, but they do learn. At 
least, that is the impression one gets from the American experience of interactions 
between markets and government of the last two decades. Overall, the strength of 
the American economy in building wealth, individual and corporate, the resilience 
of its fi nancial system and the attractiveness of its domestic markets, at least in the 
eye of foreign investors can be accredited, in no small measure to the not fl awless 
but fl exible and mostly proper economic policy actions taken. One must add, that 
the satisfactory interactions between markets and government in the last twenty 
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years or so, can be, perhaps to a large extent, credited to the quality of the American 
graduate economics education.10 This strength was refl ected in measurable terms: 
the strong, one could say  markedly superior performance of the U.S. markets 
stands out for the 1970-2011 period, when measured by GDP and employment 
growth terms  and compared to the European region, now known as the EU-27 ( 
EU 15 earlier), as was  reported by  the World Economic Report( WER 2011). 
The future global growth patterns, however will be determined more by the 
strength of the demand factors of the emerging markets, and that shift will be 
refl ected in the expected patterns of the advanced economies, too (see Figure 1 
below).
 
Note: forecasts are IMF staff estimates
Debt History and the Changing International Position of the 
USA11 
The U.S. economy is still by far the largest capital importer of the world 
economy. Even in the bad year of 2001, which was overshadowed by the September 
11-th terrorist attack, when foreign direct investment (FDI), fell by 51% to around 
10  This assumption is rarely made in economic analysis, yet we think it is important.
11  In this section, I extend and refi ne the analysis that I have given in my recent work, “Növeke-
dés és nemzetközi forrásbevonás a világgazdaságban 1980-2000”, In: Magas (2002), pp.159-178.
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USD 735 billion, (the biggest decline for over 30 years),12 it remained the largest 
importer of foreign funds. After 2008-2010 crisis and despite the sudden waning of 
the cross-border merger frenzy, America still remained the largest recipient of FDI 
with infl ows of USD 124 billion. The reasons why the United States prides itself as 
the number one importer of foreign capital are not self evident. In this section, we 
shall elaborate at some length on the meaning of international wealth.
The United States ran trade defi cits from early Colonial times to just before 
World War I, as Europeans sent investment capital to develop the continent. During 
its 300 years as a debtor nation - a net importer of capital – the United States 
progressed from the status of a minor colony to the world’s strongest power. In 
1987, the United States became a net international debtor, reverting to the position 
it was in at the start of the 20th century. By the end of 2010, U.S. net international 
wealth was -$2.8 trillion. Does this huge amount of negative international wealth 
mean that overall the U.S. is using its world economic relations to attract funds to 
build its domestic wealth? To some extent, yes. But a large part of it goes to current 
consumption and some of it disappears due to exchange rate fl uctuations.
The US government was heavily borrowing from the rest of the world over the 
last two centuries as it is depicted by Figure 2. 
Figure 2.  Gross Public Debt of the U.S.  in  % of GDP (1792-2010)
Source: St. Louis Fed.Com
12  According to the World Investment Report, quoted by The Economist, „The World this week”, 
Electronic newsletter, 14-20 September 2002. 
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How can a long term indebtedness be maintained for a large open economy? 
We begin the argument by a basic theoretical proposition:
An economy cannot have excess demands in all its markets. If there are excess 
in demands in some markets, there must be excess supplies to other markets. In an 
economy with markets for goods, market for securities and market for money this 
general equilibrium proposition asserts that
Excess demand for goods + excess demand for securities + excess demand 
for money = 0
This identity can be rewritten as:
Excess demand for goods + excess demand for securities = excess supply of 
money
In an open economy, this can be identifi ed as the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments, which can be traced back to David Hume, who argued 
that that surpluses and defi cits are self-correcting, because of their effects of 
the money supply. The modern version is an application of the Walras’s law, 
which says that excess demands and supply must sum to zero. Applied to an open 
economy, it says that a country with a balance of payment defi cit can be regarded 
as having excess demands in goods and bond markets taken together, and must 
have excess supply in its money market. It “exports” its excess supply of money 
to satisfy its excess demand for goods and bonds.13 The monetary models of the 
balance of payments have been used to explain the behavior of fl exible exchange 
rates. The monetary logic is still very appealing but empirical tests though have 
not been able to support it adequately to this day. Fisher (2001).14
13  For a detailed discussion of the merits and of the limits of the monetary approach, see Kenen 
(1988) pp. 353-371 and Száz (1991) pp. 48-84, Szentes (1999) pp.281-426, Magas (2002) pp.139-
148.
14  Monetary models of the balance of payments use very strict assumptions which are hard 
to meet in the real world. These are: (1) There are no rigidities in the factor markets. (2)There is 
perfect capital mobility, so domestic interest rates are tied strongly to foreign rates. (3) Domestic 
and foreign prices are held together by purchasing power parity, PPP, so the domestic price level is 
fi xed when the exchange rate is pegged. The PPP plays a central role, and there are strong reasons 
for doubting its validity. The PPP doctrine cannot be derived from the law of one price, which holds 
only across markets for a single good. It can be derived from the supposition that money is neutral, 
but this means that it applies to the long run and only with regard to monetary shocks. PPP should 
not be used to predict actual exchange rate behavior, even as crude rule of thumb.
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Our main question in this regard is whether Japan and Europe, the main 
sources of foreign funds fl owing to the U.S. will and/or should stay as high-savers 
and net international investors into the U.S., or rather, this cast among the leading 
industrial powers is expected to change in the foreseeable future. It will be argued 
that the for a more even future growth prospect for the world economy, the present 
international division of lenders and borrowers is largely unbalanced and thus is 
likely to change. To provide some support to this statement we shall rely on a 
standard open economy framework.
The standard open-macroeconomic framework, (Krugman-Obstfeld, 2000, 
2003, pp. 344-377), applies a set of accounting identities that link domestic 
spending, savings, and consumption and investment behavior to the capital account 
and current account balances. By these national accounting identities, one can 
identify the nature of the links between the U.S. and world economies. This will 
follow next.
Let U.S. start with the observation that U.S. national income (or national 
product) Y is either spent on consumption C, or is saved, S.
                                                       Y
I
 = C + S     
(1.)
Similarly, national expenditure (the total amount that the U.S. economy spends 
on goods and services, can be divided into spending on consumption and on 
investment. This relationship provides the second identity:
                                                           Y
s
 = C + I 
(2.)
Subtracting (2) from (1), that is National income – National spending, yields 
a new identity:
                                                           Y
I 
-Y
s
 = S – I 
 (3.)
If the U.S. economy spends more than it produces, it will invest domestically 
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more than it saves and have a net capital infl ow. The U.S. has long been known a 
low saver and a high capital-importing country. 
Beginning again with national product, let us subtract from it spending on 
domestic goods and services. The remaining goods and services must equal 
exports. Similarly, if we subtract spending on domestic goods and services from 
total expenditures, the remaining spending must be on imports. Combining these 
two identities leads to another national income identity:
National income-National spending = Exports-Imports
                                                            Y
I 
-Y
s
 = X - M 
(4.)
Figure 3 illustrates the lasting borrowing needs of the United States for the 
1991-2011 period:
Figure 3. U.S Debt and Annual Defi cit (Bill USD) 1991-2011
Source:  U.S. Dept. of Commerce, CNBC
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Equation (4.) says, that a current-account surplus arises when national output 
exceeds domestic expenditures; similarly, a current-account defi cit due to domestic 
expenditures exceeding domestic output.
Moreover, when Equation (4.) is combined with Equation (3.), we have a new 
identity:
Savings-Investment = Exports-Imports
                                                          S – I = X-M 
(5.)
According to Equation (5.), if a nation’s savings exceed its domestic investment, 
that nation will run a current account surplus.15 A nation such as the United States, 
which saves less than it invests, must run a current-account defi cit. Noting that 
savings minus domestic investment equals net foreign investment, we have the 
following identity:
Net foreign investment (NFI) = Exports - Imports 
                                                       NFI = X - M   
(6.)
Equation (6.) says that the balance on the current account must equal the net 
capital outfl ow.
These accounting identities also suggest that a current-account surplus is not 
necessarily a sign of economic vigor, nor is a current-account defi cit necessarily 
a sign of weakness or a lack of competitiveness. But there are some important 
points to be considered in this context. Indeed, economically healthy nations that 
provide good investment opportunities tend to run trade defi cits because this is 
the only way to run a capital account surplus. The U.S. ran surpluses while the 
infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff helped sink the world into depression. Similarly, 
during the 1980. In addition, nations that grow rapidly will import more goods and 
services; at the same time those weak economies will slow down or reduce their 
imports because imports are positively related to income (in the short run import 
15  This equation explains the Japanese current-account surplus: the Japanese have an extremely 
high savings rate, both in absolute terms and relative to their investment rate.
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propensities do not change). As a result, the faster a nation grows relative to the 
other economies, the larger its current-account defi cit (or smaller its surplus). 
Conversely, slower-growing nations will have smaller current-account defi cits 
(or larger surpluses). Hence, current-account defi cits may refl ect strong economic 
growth or a low level of savings, and current-account surpluses can signify a high 
level of savings or a slow rate of growth. Because current-account defi cits are 
fi nanced by capital infl ows, the cumulative effect of these defi cits is to increase 
net foreign claims against the defi cit nation reduce that nation’s net international 
wealth. Similarly, nations that consistently run current-account surpluses increase 
their net international wealth, where net international wealth is just the difference 
between a nation’s investment abroad and a foreign investment domestically. 
Sooner or later, defi cit countries like the United States become net international 
debtors, and surplus countries like Japan or Germany and the entire euro area 
become net creditors.
National spending can be divided into household spending plus private 
investment plus government spending. Household spending, in turn, equals national 
income less the sum of private savings and taxes. Combining these terms yields the 
following identity.
                                                        Y
s
 =  C + I  + G =
                                                        Y
s 
=Y
i  
-  S – T  +  I + G 
(7.)
Rearranging Equation (7.) yields a new expression for excess national spending, 
after rearranging
                                                       Y
s 
- Y
i
 = I - S  +  G - T 
(8.)
Where the government budget defi cit equals government spending minus 
taxes. Equation (8.) says that excess national spending is composed of two parts; 
the excess of private domestic investment over private savings and the total 
government (federal, state, and local defi cit). Because national spending minus 
national product equals the net capital infl ow, Equation (8.) also says that the 
nation’s excess spending equals its net borrowing from abroad.
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Rearranging and combining Equations (4.) and (8.) provides the last important 
national accounting identity:
Current-account balance CA = Private savings surplus + Government budget 
defi cit
                                                      CA = (S - I) + (T - G) 
 (9.)
Equation (9.) reveals that the nation’s current-account balance is identically 
equal to its private savings minus investment balance and the government budget 
defi cit. According to this expression, a nation running a current-account defi cit 
is not saving enough to fi nance its private investment and government budget 
defi cit. Conversely, a nation running a current-account surplus is saving more than 
is needed to fi nance its private investment and government defi cit. The important 
implication is that steps taken to correct the current-account defi cit can be effective 
only if they also change private savings, private investment, and/or the government 
defi cit. Policies or events that fail to affect both sides of the relationship shown in 
equation (9.) will not alter the current-account defi cit.
In the current world economic environment, in which growth in the developed 
countries has been sluggish and in some countries seriously depressed, there is a 
valid concern, though, on the merits of incessant and massive capital import and 
current account defi cits. The large world economic imbalance of current accounts 
should be a matter of concern even for a country as large and attractive a place to 
invest as the United States, whose national legal tender happens to be the leading 
reserve currency for the world economy. With the wild fl uctuations of currency 
values and the largely unpredictable nature of foreign exchange rates and with the 
emergence of more and more derivative products spreading risks among many 
international participants, (banks, investment banks, brokerage houses insurance 
companies, pension funds, etc.) there is a point where “internationally composed” 
risks cannot be properly “decomposed”, measured and managed either by holders 
of these products, or by the fi nancial regulators.16 Thus the idea of building (and 
buying assets) wealth internationally becomes somewhat blurred. 
True, the trust of foreign investors in the U.S. economy has been largely 
unbroken even after repeated years of dismal stock market performance and the 
calamities of September 11. But there is lot of discussion about international 
payments imbalances and unsustainable patterns of world economic growth, due 
16   For a formal interpretation of this question see Magas (2001).
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to the actual current account defi cit profi le of the developed countries. Kenneth 
Rogoff, former chief economist of the IMF, voiced this concern.17 He argued that 
the present constellation of global current account imbalances – with the U.S. in 
defi cit and Europe and Japan in surplus, – is clearly unsustainable in the log run. 
The inevitable adjustment in the current account imbalances and exchange rates 
will be much more severe when it ultimately comes. We hasten to emphasize the 
signifi cance of this argument to our analysis.
Considering that a net current account defi cit represents inter-temporal trade, 
with the defi cit nation importing more goods and services for current use and 
promising to repay net exports of goods and services in the future, one question 
must be answered. For how long can this traditional cast  last, where the U.S. 
economy  is  a debtor, Japan and Europe are  the creditors? It can be reasoned that 
for a more even and sustainable growth-pattern the world economy could surely 
benefi t from a higher U.S. savings rate and from a higher Japanese and euro area 
consumption. The best thing for the global economy would be for Europe and 
Japan to achieve a sustained increase in growth allowing private savings in the U.S. 
to rise to more normal levels without a cutback in global demand. Coordinated 
action in this regard would surely help global growth. National goals should be 
also adjusted to some commonly agreed on global growth needs.
Nonetheless, for the IMF, and for prof. Rogoff, when compared to Europe 
and Japan, the U.S market mechanisms can be looked at as still markedly positive 
examples. They believe that as long as continental Europe fails to accelerate labor 
market reform and Japan hesitates in decisively ending defl ation and addressing 
the need for restructuring its banking sector, the world is going to continue to look 
to the U.S. as the main engine of growth.
In an extensive World Economic Outlook study for 2010, the IMF has 
documented that the increase in business cycle correlation across the largest 
countries of OECD is roughly 55 per cent. This is signifi cantly less than the 
correlation of business cycles across the states within the U.S. So there is a lot of 
room for the closing up of growth cycles and for macro policy coordination, with 
further integration of OECD markets.
Viewing Europe from the outside, ”reforms to facilitate EMU members ability 
to adjust to shocks and cope with secular change has been rather slow. Employment 
17  See the seminal article in the Wall Street Journal:” Professor Joseph Stiglitz and Kenneth Rog-
off offer starkly different views on hopes and risks for the world economy.” WSJ Oct. 18-20, 2002 
R8. The dilemma has as one which is almost unchanged, and has fi rmly reappeard in the 2008-2011 
crisis years. 
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rates remain far below those in the US. This is by far the strongest reason why 
per capita income is much higher in the U.S. than in Europe. High tax burdens, 
generous unemployment benefi ts, high minimum wages and huge costs of layoffs 
are among the reasons why employment is relatively low in Europe.” (WSJ. 2009, 
Oct. 18-20. R8.)
This line of the Rogoff logic that contrasts European and American labor 
market effi ciency is spelled out with respect to the different growth prospects of the 
two regions and has been fi rmly argued earlier by Solow (2000), too. The current 
European system of adjustment mechanisms is just too rigid and insuffi ciently adept 
at dealing with the environment of constant change we see in the current world 
economic environment. Without a clear plan for medium term budget consolidation 
in some of the largest countries of EMU, growth prospects remain modest. Growth 
will only come if Europe successfully confronts its broader structural problems. 
These are very strong confi rmations from two top-notch economists to help us 
believe that the bulk of future global growth is not going to come but mainly from 
the future wealth - and especially the large banks - in the high-saver countries of 
the world economy. 
But beside the large international payments imbalances between high- and 
low-saver countries, there are some other new global concerns departing from the 
U.S. economy, namely the rebirth of the business cycle concerns. We shall discuss 
that next.
Can We Read Business Cycles? 
If in the coming years we shall always be looking for consumption to pick up 
in the U.S. and for fi nancing from elsewhere, we may have a global business cycle 
problem at our hands. Cyclical patterns and their smoothing by government action 
are a reborn concern in the American economy itself.18 It appears, though, as if the 
views about governments’ ability to tame the business cycle have themselves moved 
in cycles. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was widely believed that Keynesian demand-
management policies could stabilise economies: a properly measured increase or 
decrease in government spending was all that was needed to reach the desired level 
of output. But the stagfl ation of the 1970s produced a new economic consensus 
that governments were powerless to do anything except restrain infl ation. By the 
18  Cyclical behavior of the American economy was a more pronounced concern in the 1970s and 
in the 1980s, (Erdős T. (1976), Magas (1987).
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1990s the business cycle returned.19 The American mainstream economic opinion 
has refl ected this and had traditionally had the anti-cyclical stance of government 
spending. So, there is some evidence of learning from past experience.
The current dilemma is that three strongest economic regions of the global 
economy are growing at distinctly different rates and all are looking for increasing 
foreign demand. America’s mild recession in the years 2001 followed its longest 
unbroken expansion in history. The euro area, until 2008 was in its ninth year 
of growth, it has escaped outright recession, but has seen a sharp slowdown. In 
contrast, Japan’s economy has suffered three recessions since its own bubble burst 
at the beginning of the 1990s. In Europe, where infl ation is not the problem but 
unemployment is. France has made it clear that it wants the Growth and Stability 
Pact redefi ned, so it can have a more expansionary fi scal policy. Stiglitz (2002), for 
instance, thinks that Europe has adopted a policy, which is pro-cyclical, which fl ies 
in the face of what it should be doing. It should be anti-cyclical (do not cut your 
government spending in a recession).20 Japan is indeed a great concern, too, with 
respect to global growth prospects. Japan needs a determined effort to clean up its 
banking sector, encourage needed corporate restructuring, and rein in ballooning 
fi scal defi cits over the medium term. It should act decisively to end defl ation. So 
far, Japan has tried a gradualist, “muddling through” approach. Far more ambitious 
and sweeping reforms are needed. To some extent Japan is wrestling with the crisis 
of the Japanese corporate model of a kind. The traditional sources of growth, as 
accounted for by Móczár (1987), have not been fully exhausted, they are just being 
suppressed by a deep and unusually stubborn defl ationary cycle.
19  The U.S. economy had three recessions between 1974 and 1982. However, since then, it has 
enjoyed two long booms, in the 1980s and again in the 1990s, interrupted only briefl y by a mild 
downturn, leading many to believe that recessions were a thing of the past.  For more on this issue 
see The Economist, Jan 4th 2003.
20   He argued that.” Europe thought it could weather the storm on its own, but they have had their 
hands tied by the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact that codifi ed the euro areas’ fi scal rules. Unlike in 
the U.S. they have a monetary authority that is not supposed to look at employment and growth. The 
Stability and Growth Pact is somewhat similar to the balanced budget amendment, which the U.S. 
rejected on the grounds that it would be disastrous to have your hands tied in a way that makes you 
unable to respond to a downturn.” WSJ, Oct. 18-20. R8. But the stability and growth pact in Europe 
is to be taken seriously. The European Commission issued warnings to those big EU member states, 
Germany, France and Italy for their excessive budget defi cits. The harshest criticism was aimed at 
Germany, which is likely to breach the pact’s ceiling for defi cits of 3 % of GDP both in 2002 and 
2003.  This implies that strong, nationally determined choices do remain. For a detailed analysis of 
this confl ict, see the article ”Breaking the Pact “The Economist, Jan 4th 2003. The current, 2011 No-
vember situation is alarmingly similar where the what was at stake was the breakup of the Eurozone 
(see more on this WSJ. Nov. 2011 Nov 13.)
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In relation to the steep economic downturn in the U.S. and in world markets 
in general, one question is often asked: Do Central bankers monitor infl ation and 
cycle-related wealth effects together? 
In the U.S., the Fed does take asset prices into account in its policymaking, 
but only in so far as changes in them are transmitted to demand in the economy 
and thus potentially affect the rate of infl ation. The likely transmission mechanism 
is the “wealth effect”. As share prices rise, people feel better off and spend more; 
as they fall, people feel poorer and spend less, reducing infl ationary pressure. In 
practice, the FED has seemed to act on the wealth effect only after share prices have 
fallen. For instance, when prices tumbled after the collapse of LTCM, (The Long 
Figure 4. Business cycle in the OECD countries 1990-2010 
 
 
Figure 5.   Business cycle in the US Economy 1990-2010 
 
Source of Figure 4. & 5.: OECD Economic Data Bank 
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Term Capital Management Hedge Fund), the Fed cut interest rates sharply, and 
shares started to recover at once. Given that a central bank could never be 100% 
sure at the time that there is a bubble, would it be justifi ed in trying to burst it if it 
were 80% sure, or 40%? This is a diffi cult question, and not just because raising 
interest rates would be unpopular; if it were raising rates to control infl ation, it 
would willingly bear that burden for the sake of the economy. Keeping infl ation 
under control does not challenge people’s judgments; by maintaining the real 
value of the currency, it actually helps them to be confi dent that a price means 
what it appears to. By contrast, asset prices refl ect the free judgments about value 
made by millions of people who have backed those judgments with their own 
money. Over the past decade investors, fi rms and consumers worldwide put far 
too much faith in the power of information technology, globalisation, fi nancial 
liberalisation and monetary policy to reduce volatility and risk. It did not pay off. 
ICT, information communication technology, the very sector that was supposed 
to smooth out the business cycle through better inventory control, has ended 
up intensifying the current downturn. In principle, globalisation can help to 
stabilise economies if they are at different stages of the cycle, as was suggested 
by Obstfeld (1998), Pugel-Lindert (2002, pp. 552-554), but the very forces of 
global integration are likely to synchronise economic cycles more closely, so 
that downturns in different countries are more likely to reinforce one another. 
Financial liberalisation is supposed to help households to borrow in bad times 
and so smooth out consumption, but again it has trade-offs: it also makes it easier 
for fi rms and households to take on too much debt during booms, which may 
exacerbate subsequent downturns. This is what happened in the fi rst half of the 
1990s in Japan21.
In the United States, Alan Greenspan is widely considered a highly successful 
chairman of the Federal Reserve, but the belief that he has special powers to 
eliminate the cycle is probably naive. In July 2001, Mr. Greenspan himself said in 
testimony to Congress: 
“Can fi scal and monetary policy acting at their optimum eliminate the business 
cycle? The answer, in my judgement, is no, because there is no tool to change 
human nature. Too often people are prone to recurring bouts of optimism and 
pessimism that manifest themselves from time to time in the build-up or cessation 
of speculative excesses.”  (As quoted by Reuters news service)
Indeed, speculative excesses in asset prices and credit fl ows might occur more 
frequently in the future, thanks to the combined effects of fi nancial liberalisation 
21  For a detailed description of the Japanese growth problem related to over-borrowing in the 
fi rst of half of the 1990s, see Magas (2002) pp. 403-410.
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and a monetary-policy framework that concentrates on infl ation but places no direct 
constraint on credit growth and wealth effects. 
“It’s only when the tide goes out that you can see who’s swimming naked.”22A 
witty and realistic description of what was happening in the American economy 
lately. The stock market boom in the late 1990s masked excessive borrowing by fi rms 
and households, “irrational exuberance”, - the expression of Alan Greenspan - and 
infectious greed is being shockingly exposed. Share prices have suffered their steepest 
slide since the 1930s. Yet, this was not a normal business cycle, but the end of the 
biggest stock market boom in America’s history. Never before have shares become 
so overvalued. Between 1997-2001 share prices of the S&P 500 index refl ected 30-
50% more reported profi ts than the national accounts profi ts registered at year end 
by offi cial GDP statistics.23 Never before have so many people owned shares. And 
never before has every part of the economy invested (indeed, over-invested) in a new 
technology. 
In short, it appears that the business cycle is still alive, but it does appear to have 
become more subdued. During the past 20 years, the American economy has been 
in recession less than 10% of the time. In the 90 years before the Second World War, 
it was in recession 40% of the time. In most other economies, too, expansions have 
got longer and recessions shorter and shallower. The exception is Japan, which in the 
past decade has suffered the deepest slump in any rich economy since the 1930s.
The revolt against Keynesian policies since the 1970s was based on the belief 
that government intervention is ineffi cient and it may destabilise the economy. 
However, America’s recent experience has shown that the private sector is quite 
capable of destabilising things without government help. The most recent bubble 
was not confi ned to the stock market: instead, the whole economy became 
distorted. Firms over-borrowed and over-invested on unrealistic expectations 
about future profi ts and the belief that the business cycle was dead. Consumers 
ran up huge debts and saved too little, believing that an ever rising stock market 
would boost their wealth. The boom became self-reinforcing as rising profi t 
expectations pushed up share prices, which increased investment and consumer 
spending. Higher investment and the then still strong dollar helped to hold down 
infl ation and hence interest rates, fuelling faster growth and higher share prices. 
That virtuous circle has turned vicious and did tremendous damage: since March 
2007 until December of 2009, the Dow Jones Industrials Stock Index has fallen 
by more than 49%, some $7 trillion has been wiped off the value of American 
22  This sarcastic remark can be often heard in the American fi nancial community. The phrase is 
said to have been used fi rst by Warren Buffett, one of Wall street‘s best-known investors.
23  Source: Dresdner-Wasserstein; Thomson Datastream 14 Dec. 2004
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shares, equivalent to two-thirds of annual GDP! 24 In addition, global growth is 
still very cyclical.
Figure 6. Performance of DOW Jones Stock Index 2077-2011
Source: Bloomberg.com
If labour productivity remains strong, it should help fi rms to restore profi ts as 
well as ensure robust long-term growth. The slide in the stock market, then, may 
only refl ect a crisis of confi dence in corporate governance and accounting fraud, 
not deep-seated economic problems. It is true that until 2010 America has benefi ted 
from faster productivity growth since the mid-1990s (although the rise is less than 
once thought).25 But, as with all previous technological revolutions, from railways 
to electricity to cars, excess capacity and increased competition, in the long run, 
are ensuring that most of the benefi ts of higher productivity go to consumers and 
workers, in the shape of lower prices and higher real wages, rather than into profi ts. 
This is the highly desired outcome of any well-performing capitalism. Equity returns 
are therefore likely to be a lot lower over the next decade than the preceding one. 
As a result, households will need to save much more towards their pensions, which 
- other factors being unchanged - will drag down growth somewhat. But even then, 
its very likely, for the U.S. economy to recover and gather sustainable momentum 
with the recent fi scal and monetary stimulus, there is no other safe way out for long 
term growth but increasing domestic savings and rely less on foreign funds.
To sum it all up, we conclude that after decades of declining economic 
volatility in developed economies, the business cycle may become more volatile 
again over the coming years mainly as a function of the changing fortunes of asset 
24  As reported by Goldman Sachs, U.S. Weekly Analyst, March  24, 2011-, quoted by Thomson 
Datastream 
25  The fi rst two waves of the computer age starting in the early 1980s for some very special rea-
sons - and to a large extent paradoxically - did not bring the long expected productivity gains for the 
American economy. For a detailed discussion of the probable causes of lagging productivity growth 
in the fi rst half of the 1990s, see Magas (2002) pp. 392-403.
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markets and with it the volatile wealth position of American savers and consumers. 
In addition, the IT revolution and globalization apparently have not deleted the 
business cycle.
Key Currency Rates Defy Theories
It is still a major global concern about fl oating exchange rates of key currencies 
that they can be highly variable. Some variability presumably is not controversial, 
including exchange rate movements that offset infl ation rate differentials and 
exchange rate movements that promote an orderly adjustment to shocks (Erdős 
1998, pp. 299-305, Darvas, 1996, Szapáry 1999, Pugel-Lindert, 2002, pp. 402-
404, Bernanke, 2008, pp. 446-448). However, the substantial variability of 
exchange rates within fairly short time periods like months or a few years is more 
controversial. What are the possible effects of exchange rate variability that might 
concern us? If the variability simply creates unexpected gains and losses for short-
term fi nancial investors who deliberately take positions exposed to exchange rate 
risk, we probably would not be much concerned. However, we would be concerned 
if heightened exchange rate risk discourages such international activities as trade 
in goods and services or foreign direct investment. Exchange rate variability then 
would have real effects, by altering activities in the part of the economy that 
produces goods and services.
Overshooting raises another concern about real effects of the variability of 
fl oating exchange rates. When exchange rates overshoot, they send signals about 
changes in international price competitiveness. Big swings in price competitiveness 
create incentives for large shifts in real sources. For example, if overshooting leads 
to a large appreciation of the country’s currency, this creates the incentive for labor 
to move out of export-orientated and import-competing industries, as the country 
loses a large amount of price-competitiveness. New capital investment in these 
industries is strongly discouraged, and some existing facilities are shut down. 
However, as the overshooting then reverses itself, these resource movements appear 
to have been excessive. Resources then must move back into these industries.
Relative price adjustments are an important and necessary part of the market 
system. They signal the need for resource reallocations. The concern here is not 
with relative price changes in general. The concern is with the possibility that the 
dynamics of fl oating exchange rates sometimes send false price signals or signals 
that are too strong, resulting in excessive resource reallocations. Proponents and 
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defenders of fl oating rates agree that variability has been high and that some real 
effects occur. Exchange rates are price signals about the relative values of currencies. 
These signals represent the summary of information about the currencies at that 
time. As economic and political conditions change the price signals change too. 
The variability of exchange rates represents the ongoing market-based quest for 
economic effi ciency. The proponents of fl oating rates believe that the supporters 
of fi xed rates delude themselves by claiming that the lack of variability of fi xed 
rates is a virtue. A fi xed exchange rate can be looked at as form of price control. 
Price controls are generally ineffi cient because they either too high or too low. That 
is with a fi xed rate the country’s currency is often overvalued or undervalued by 
government fi at. Sudden changes can be highly disruptive, and it often occurs in a 
crisis atmosphere brought on by large capital fl ows, as speculators believe that they 
have a one-way speculative gamble on the direction of the exchange rate.
In sum, as a general statement on the exchange rate debate it can be said that 
variability and overshooting may have logic in international fi nance, but they 
nonetheless cause undesirable real effects like discouragement of international 
trade and excessive resource shifts.26 Exchange rates should make transactions 
between countries as smooth and easy as possible. To the opponents of fl oating 
rates, exchange rates, like money, serve transaction functions best when their 
values are stable.
Each of the major international capital market related currency crises since 
1994 in Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea in 1997, Russia and Brazil, 
Argentina and Turkey in 2000, has in some way involved fi xed or pegged exchange 
rate regimes. At the same time, countries that did not have pegged rates - among 
them South-Africa, Israel, Turkey, and Mexico in 1998 - avoided crises of the type 
that affected emerging market countries with pegged rates. Little wonders, then, 
that policymakers involved in dealing with these crises warned strongly against 
the types of pegged rates for countries open to international capital fl ows. That 
warning has tended to take the form of advice that intermediate policy regimes 
between hard pegs and fl oating are not sustainable.
But this bipolar view has not solidifi ed either until today. Fisher (2001) argued 
that proponents of this bipolar view – himself included- have exaggerated their 
point for a dramatic effect. The right statement with respect to desirability of fl exible 
26  There is a rapidly growing literature on alternative theories of exchange rate behavior and on 
the evaluation of the impacts of real exchange rate changes in particular. Empirical results point to 
many different directions, which are hard to encapsulate into a single new theory. For a review, see: 
Froot-Rogoff (1995) and Edison- Melick (1999), Darvas (1996).
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exchange rate regimes is that “For countries open to international capital fl ows (i) 
pegs are not sustainable unless they are very hard indeed; but (ii) a wide variety 
of exchange rates are possible; and (iii) it is to be expected that policy in most 
countries will not be indifferent to exchange rate movements” (Fisher, 2001, p. 2). 
For Hungary, as well as for other emerging markets, this statement has strongly 
proven itself, Darvas (1996), Szapáry (1999), Magas (2000), Ábel-Kóbor (2008).
On the way to developing a fundamental, let alone “fool proof” theory on 
the determination of exchange rates serious doubts remain. In a seminal IMF 
working paper, Brooks, Edison, Kumar, Slǿk (2001), the authors have found, for 
instance, that the key feature of currency markets over the 2000-2001 has been 
the pronounced weakness of the euro particularly against the U.S. dollar. The 
theoretically important feature of their argument was that the weakness seemed 
to have defi ed “traditional” explanations of exchange rate determination, which 
focus on interest rate differentials and current account imbalances. For instance, 
in the mentioned years the interest rate differentials moved in favor of the euro 
in many instance, yet successive hikes of short term rates by the ECB were often 
associated with euro weakness rather than strengthening it. In addition, the dollar 
gained against the euro even if euro area current account moved into strong 
surplus while U.S. current account defi cit has grown! There was a need to look for 
alternative explanations emphasizing the impact of porfolio and FDI investments, 
for example. Up until July of 2001, the Porfolio fl ows from the euro area to the 
U.S. stocks refl ected differences in expected differences in productivity growth, 
they have tracked movements in the euro/U.S. dollar rate closely. At the same time, 
the yen versus dollar exchange rate movements remained more closely tied to the 
conventional variables as the current account and interest rate differentials. The 
paper concluded that different forces determined these two key exchange rates of 
international fi nancial markets and that the currency traders must have looked at 
different aspects too. This makes one wonder about the applicability of some safe 
and proven laws on foreign-currency denominated asset building.
The same idea was confi rmed by Ábel-Kóbor (2008). We are not speaking 
of the short term driving forces that rule on these enormous markets which move 
money to the tune of a trillion dollar a day! That motive is obvious, short-term 
profi t making. Make no mistake. It is clear that that the foreign exchange market 
is no different from any other fi nancial market in its susceptibility to profi table 
forecasting determined by laws. Instead, we mean a reliable set of rules that can 
determine longer-term expectations. Very likely, there is no such thing as a fi xed 
set, one, which is not subject to change. In light of these uncertainties, little wonder 
that The IMF working paper itself closed with a careful statement:
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“To day the high reliance of the U.S. on capital infl ows to fi nance the current 
account balance has not been a problem, but if expectations of relative rates of 
return on assets, particularly in the euro area were to increase, Competition for 
global funds could make markets sensitive to the large U.S. current account defi cit 
and lead to substantial and rather abrupt changes in major currency rates.” 
(Brooks et al, 2001, p.26)
This warning, rather than an intended prophecy, let alone forecast, has come 
true by the end of 2011. It could have been said word by word 10 years after it fi rst 
appeared in press! The U.S. dollar depreciated by almost 15 per cent against the euro, 
and by 10 percent against the Japanese yen. The problem is that even a moderately 
precise explanation of why this has happened is by no means straightforward. 
Based on the above uncertainties, it becomes very hard indeed to assess (let alone 
forecast) the real effects of the big swings in exchange rate movements between the 
three key currencies of the world economy. This is a reason for future concerns.
Now, let us turn to the last American-born global market phenomena, to what 
we call real and “designed complexity” to spread risk.
Fragile Securities Markets: A Need for Better Regulation
With the spread of modern technology to gather, store and generate information 
about non tangible but engineered fi nancial products (derivatives) that do not 
have a traditional market value, one that can be easily measured against its utility 
(weighing its profi tability against its risk), there is new world and indeed a new 
division of labor being formed that neither Adam Smith or nor his successors could 
have foreseen. The market for these derivative products is growing rapidly, both on 
futures and options exchanges and in private sales, which tend to be more complex 
and more lucrative, at least for a while. In this new world, the art (not science) 
of valuing shares may be getting harder because of changes in the nature of the 
economy, creating even greater scope for bubbles to form. When the bulk of a 
company’s assets were physical and its markets were relatively stable, valuation 
was more straightforward. Now growing proportions of a fi rm’s assets-brands, 
ideas, human capital-are intangible and often hard to identify, let alone value. They 
are also less robust than a physical asset such as a factory.27  This new, partly IT-
27  As the collapse of U.S. energy fi rm Enron showed, a reputation for trustworthiness, and the 
market value resulting from it, can vanish in a moment. The dotcoms pushed this valuation chal-
lenge to extremes, often expecting investors to put a price on profi ts that would not be forthcoming 
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related, complex market development has increased the diffi culties of assessing 
risk and value, especially in a global context.
Still, as long as risk remained concentrated within a country and largely its 
banks, its fi nancial regulators should have been able to keep tabs on it. The trouble 
with today’s global pool of capital is that regulators may be out of their depth. 
Does a global fi nancial system need a global regulator? 
Who regulates Citigroup, the world’s largest and most diverse fi nancial 
institution? With its operations in over 100 countries, selling just about every 
fi nancial product that has ever been invented, probably every fi nancial regulator 
in the world feels that Citi is, to some degree, his problem. America alone has the 
Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodities and 
Futures Trading Commission, the New York Stock Exchange, 50 state insurance 
commissioners and many others. Yet in a sense nobody truly regulates Citi: it is a 
global fi rm in a world of national and sometimes sectoral watchdogs. The same is 
true of AIG, General Electric Capital, UBS, Deutsche Bank and many more.
Might that be a good thing? The regulator, Britain’s Financial Services Authority, 
holds that it has become fashionable to think of regulators as Shakespeare’s 
„caterpillars of the commonwealth, creatures who, far from adding value, get in 
the way of the market”. All the same, it seems clear that much of the dynamism in 
global fi nance during the past three decades has been due to fewer regulations on 
the movement of capital, particularly across borders, and on what can be done with 
it. For the most part, money is now free to fl ow wherever an opportunity presents 
itself, and has generally done so, leaving everybody better off than with heavy 
regulation.
Leaving capital free to move where it could earn the highest return also 
showed up over-costly or misplaced regulation: the money simply went elsewhere. 
For instance, because Japan prohibited the use of derivatives, options in Japanese 
securities were traded in more accommodating Singapore. As Japan gradually eased 
these restrictions, some of the offshore business shifted back to Tokyo. In general, 
competition for capital has encouraged countries to improve their regulation to 
appeal to mobile capital-although some, such as Malaysia, have resisted this 
pressure, and continue to impose controls on cross-border capital fl ows. 
Strikingly, there has been no race to the bottom in regulation. Behind every 
great market is good regulation-whether by a government agency or organised 
by the market participants. Internationally mobile capital has tended to reward 
for many years, and would be derived from business models and intangible assets such as brands 
that had not yet been created.
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regulation that protects investors and minimises privileges for market insiders. 
Broadly speaking, this has led to a convergence of regulation around common 
international standards, but this process is by no means complete, particularly for 
investment products sold to personal investors. The day when a global fi rm can sell 
the same simple stock market-index fund anywhere in the world remains a long 
way off. America remains reluctant to allow European securities exchanges to ply 
their trade via screens in America, even though technically this is now easy to do. 
„Outrageously protectionist” may comment the European regulator.
Given the political diffi culties, the idea of a single global regulator is not on 
any serious agenda. That may be just as well: competition among regulators has 
some benefi ts. What is on the agenda, at least of the regulators in countries open 
to international capital, is to ensure that good information is available about the 
state of global markets and about fi nancial fi rms’ global operations. The FSA, for 
example, is able to regulate only Citigroup’s British activities, but it will have a 
much better chance of doing it well if it knows enough about the health of the fi rm 
worldwide. Information is already fl owing more freely between different national 
regulators. Multinational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
Bank for International Settlements and the Financial Stability Forum all play a 
useful part in this, but it is bilateral communication between national regulators 
that matters most-and the global fi nancial system is nowhere near as transparent to 
national regulators as it should be.
One reason is that no global consensus exists on what exactly should be 
regulated. For instance, in Britain reinsurers are regulated by the FSA, but in their 
home markets Munich Re and Swiss Re, the world’s largest reinsurance companies, 
are mostly unregulated.  Non-fi nancial fi rms with big fi nancial operations do not 
fi t comfortably into the current regulatory framework anywhere. Enron, which 
has been plausibly described as an investment bank or hedge fund with an energy 
business on the side, was not regulated in America. In Britain, the fi rm itself was not 
regulated, but its fi nancial subsidiaries were monitored by the FSA. There are big 
question marks over who regulates the growing number of fi rms now transforming 
themselves into fi nancial behemoths, modelled on GE with its huge GE Capital 
operation. Hedge funds and other highly leveraged institutions are regulated lightly 
in most countries, and not at all in America. 
A second problem, at least in foreign eyes, is that America has too many 
different regulators. Whereas Britain has merged its numerous fi nancial regulators 
into a single authority, and several other countries around the world are moving the 
same way, America continues with its plethora of different regulators for different 
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parts of the fi nancial-services industry. It seems doubtful that any of them has a 
good overview of what is happening in America’s fi nancial system as a whole-
though the Fed claims it gets all the information it needs, one way or another. 
Some American regulators defend their multiple systems, despite the 
considerable duplication it entails, mainly on the ground that regulatory competition 
keeps them keen and lean. Certainly, the superiority of the single, consolidated 
regulator has yet to be proved. Still, the current division of labour among the 
different American regulators is hard to justify. 
Why, for instance, should the SEC oversee trading on stock exchanges and the 
CFTC trading on futures exchanges when the regulatory needs of all exchanges 
are essentially the same? And why is insurance regulated not federally but at the 
state level, mostly by elected insurance commissioners? Nobody really thinks this 
makes sense, but the system survives because each regulatory body has its own 
supporters in Congress. In some respects, an ineffi cient regulatory system suits 
powerful fi nancial fi rms. The Glass-Steagall laws, which kept banks, investment 
banks and insurers separate, survived a dozen attempts in Congress to scrap them-
until 1998, when Travellers, an insurer, merged with Citibank, which immediately 
ended its expensive lobbying against abolition. They went soon after.
Many think that a single regulator along FSA lines would be good for America’s 
capital markets. The Dodd–Frank Financial Act has reformed the entire system for 
the satisfaction of almost all players, true the product is lengthy, it is incorporated 
into  twenty fi ve hundred pages of new legislation. 
So far America’s cumbersome regulatory system does not seem to have retarded 
the development of its markets, but in the long run it may prove costly, particularly 
if-and it is a big if-the European Union succeeds in fully integrating its capital 
markets and introducing appropriate regulation. America has long boasted of having 
the most effi cient capital markets in the world, and to date that has broadly been 
true. But its unwieldy system of multiple regulators could become a competitive 
disadvantage should Europe develop a better, less costly regulatory mousetrap. 
Indeed, it is possible that pressure from the EU will help to consolidate American 
regulation. Under a forthcoming EU directive, any fi nancial conglomerate operating 
within the Union will have to choose a main EU regulator who will be responsible 
for global supervision of the fi rm. In practice, the European regulator for the big 
American fi rms, such as Goldman and Citi, will probably delegate by requiring the 
fi rm to nominate one of the American regulators as its „co-ordinating regulator”, 
which would become a de facto single national regulator for the fi rm. 
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Even if the infrastructure for effective global regulation were in place, huge 
challenges would remain. Some are of an intellectual sort. „How much failure 
should a regulatory system allow?”, e.g. it should be more than zero, and less than 
would cause system-wide collapse. It may be a tribute to American regulation that 
Enron was actually allowed to go bust, and luckily this does not appear to have had 
system-wide consequences. Some countries might have tried to organise a rescue; 
indeed, even the Fed has a reputation for keeping alive fi rms that should have 
been allowed to die. Understanding whether the level of risk is getting too high 
has become harder now that so much risk is being transferred out of the banking 
system. Many worry that regulators and fi nancial fi rms alike are better at judging 
the relative riskiness of different instruments, institutions and counterparties than 
the total risk in the system. The worries became more than evident after the Lehman 
events.
The problem has been brought to the fore by the technology bubble, and the 
fear of a wider American equity bubble. Do regulators know when a bubble has 
formed and the fi nancial system is becoming dangerously imbalanced? Probably 
not with enough certainty to base policy on. What is clearer is that aggregate risk 
ebbs and fl ows with the economic cycle,  credit  offi cers tend to lend too much in 
good times, heating up the economy, and then cut back too much in a downturn, 
making things worse. 
One way to get round this, would be to require banks to set aside higher amounts 
of capital during economic booms than during recessions, to make risk-taking less 
pro-cyclical. How much capital fi nancial fi rms should set aside against risks going 
wrong is the trickiest decision international regulators have to make. Since 1988, 
big banks have been abiding by the Basel capital regime, which links the amount of 
capital they have to hold in reserve to the riskiness of the loans they make. 
However, the categories of risk are too undifferentiated: banks have to set 
aside as much capital against a loan to Microsoft, much against a loan to America 
as one to South Korea. Banks have also discovered ways to use derivatives and 
other securities to allow relatively risky loans to qualify for a low-risk, low-capital 
treatment. Regulators fear that a large part of the growth in the use of derivatives 
and securitisation by banks may stem from evasion of regulatory controls. 
Basel 3, a more sophisticated version of risk-based capital rules, is now in the 
pipeline. It is meant to apply not only to big banks but to all banks worldwide, and 
to all investment fi rms in the EU. There is also talk of an insurance Basel 3 before 
long. But Basel 3 has met with considerable opposition, partly because it is too 
complicated, partly because some countries disagree over how much capital should 
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be set aside against some sorts of loans. Germany wants a lower capital requirement 
for loans to small businesses, for example, because bank loans are their traditional 
source of funding. The launch of the new regime, originally scheduled for 2013, 
has already been delayed until 2014, and even that may prove to be optimistic. 
Meanwhile, the banks are operating with a capital regime that does not work as 
intended, but may be lulling regulators into a false sense of security.
In determining regulatory capital, Basel 3 would give an even more important 
role to credit-rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. How good 
their ratings are is the subject of much debate. As an alternative, banks will be 
encouraged to use their own in-house credit ratings. But regulators still mistrust 
the use of quantitative credit-risk models to set regulatory capital. They need better 
techniques and better data, especially in Europe. 
Many big banks already use quantitative models to assess how much capital they need 
to set aside against portfolios of marketable securities. These „value at risk” (VAR) models 
typically measure the most the fi rm could lose in a day, judging by past performance, 
but they tend to underestimate the frequency with which really bad days occur. There 
have been half a dozen „perfect storms” in the market in the past decade, during which 
VAR calculations proved useless in predicting losses. Stress-testing portfolios against 
imaginary perfect storms remedies some of the weaknesses. But modelling credit risk in 
this way is much harder, not least because data about past credit performance are scarce.
Another market-based system of regulation has also received some attention. If 
banks issue short-term subordinated debt that is traded every day and has to be refi nanced 
regularly, and can stay in business only as long as the debt is refi nanced, then the market 
will in effect regulate the bank. Lenders will not fi nance a bank they think is in risk 
of default. Alas, the only country to have tried it so far has been Argentina, where the 
government’s fl eecing of the banking system after its debt default rather spoilt the plot. 
Regulators are only too aware that the sheer complexity of the fi nancial system 
imposes practical limitations on what they can do. Increasingly, they are having to rely 
on the private sector to assist them in their regulatory task. They simply do not have the 
capacity to fi nd out what risks are being taken inside a large international bank unless it 
tells them. 
The consolidation in the banking sector may be increasing the risk of the fi nancial 
system in other ways. 28  
28  Consolidation has cut down the number of big market participants. In 1995, 20 banks in the 
United States accounted for 75% of foreign exchange transactions; by 2001, the number was down 
to 13. What is certain is that fi nancial fi rms, especially on Wall Street and in the City of London, 
love derivatives, and have hired an army of mathematicians and p physicists to work as “fi nancial 
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The new global dilemma, and with it the real danger, that the risk originally 
taken on by the capital markets will eventually fi nd its way back into the banking 
system. 
Much of the risk-transfer apparently being undertaken may be an accounting 
ruse, designed to escape regulatory capital requirements without truly shedding the 
risk. And if insurers are unable to meet their liabilities and go bankrupt, the banks 
may be caught short of needed reserve funds. It is safe to assume that much of 
the unwanted risk assumed by the banking sector may end up in the hands of less 
sophisticated investors, including some of the individuals now being targeted by 
the fi nancial-services fi rms. They may be taking on this risk unwittingly. Nobody 
knows how those individuals might react if they found out, or how this would affect 
the economy as a whole. They might feel poorer and less inclined to spend, which 
could infl ict the sort of damage on the economy and the banking system fears. 
There is a real threat that it might accelerate itself through the reverse multiplier. 
Still, as long as risk remained concentrated within a country and largely its banks, 
its fi nancial regulators should have been able to keep tabs on it. The trouble with 
today’s global pool of capital is that regulators may be out of their depth, their 
national jurisdiction. In this sense, there is an obvious need for global regulation. 
At the same time, it seems clear that much of the dynamism in global fi nance 
during the past three decades has been due to fewer regulations on the movement 
of capital, particularly across borders, and on what can be done with it. For the 
most part, money is now free to fl ow wherever an opportunity presents itself, and 
has generally done so, leaving everybody better off than with heavy regulation. 
One should add better off, in the general case, with normal behavior.29
Behind every great market is good regulation -whether by a government 
agency or organized by the market participants. Internationally mobile capital 
engineers”, creating complex new derivatives to shift risk around the fi nancial system. Credit de-
rivatives already have a nominal value of almost $1 trillion, up from around $100 billion fi ve years 
ago. They are forecast to top $4 trillion by 2012. The nominal value of over-the-counter derivatives 
now exceeds $100 trillion, 60% of which is handled by a mere fi ve dealers, including two giants, 
J.P. Morgan and Citigroup. Derivatives and other tools of fi nancial engineering can be used to man-
age risk better by hedging positions and transferring unwanted risk to a counter-party, which is what 
banks say they mostly use them for. However, those tools can also be used to increase risk, perhaps 
by a big margin, and there is a growing danger that this will be done accidentally. 
29 In this context, mention must be made of how a natural scientist views the world of modern 
fi nancial markets, and ask the question more often heard: „Why do so many people cling so hard to 
the notion of effi cient markets?”  Emanuel Derman of Goldman Sachs, one of the growing number 
of former physicists working in investment banking, puts this notion in perspective. In fi nance, he 
says, you are playing against people, who value assets on the basis of their feelings about the future. 
“These feelings are ephemeral, or at best unstable.” What a simple way to portray the complex 
reality as quoted by U.S. Weekly Analyst, Goldman Sachs, March 24. 2002.
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has tended to reward regulation that protects investors and minimizes privileges 
for market insiders. Broadly speaking, this has led to a convergence of regulation 
around common international standards, but this process is by no means complete, 
particularly for investment products sold to personal investors. The day when a 
global fi rm can sell the same simple stock-market-index fund anywhere in the 
world remains a long way off. 
Given the serious political diffi culties, the idea of a single global regulator is 
not on any serious agenda. That may be just as well: competition among regulators 
has some benefi ts. What is on the agenda, at least of the regulators in countries 
open to international capital, is to ensure that good information is available about 
the state of global markets and about fi nancial fi rms’ global operations. The FSA, 
for example, is able to regulate only Citigroup’s British activities, but it will have a 
much better chance of doing it well if it knows enough about the health of the fi rm 
worldwide30  Information is already fl owing more freely between different national 
regulators. Multinational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
Bank for International Settlements and the Financial Stability Forum all play a 
useful part in this, but it is bilateral communication between national regulators 
that matters most, and the global fi nancial system is nowhere near as transparent to 
national regulators as it should be (Magas, 2000b, 2009).31 
Understanding whether the level of risk is getting too high has become harder 
now that so much risk is being transferred out of the banking system. The problem 
has been brought to the fore by the technology bubble, and the fear of a wider 
American equity bubble. Do regulators know when a bubble has formed and the 
fi nancial system is becoming dangerously unbalanced? Probably not, with enough 
certainty to base policy on. What is clearer is that aggregate risk changes and fl ows 
30  In some respects, however, an ineffi cient regulatory system suits powerful fi nancial fi rms.  In 
the United States The Glass-Steagall laws, which kept banks, investment banks and insurers sepa-
rate, survived a dozen attempts in Congress to scrap them -until 1998, when Travelers, an insurer, 
merged with Citibank,  (which immediately ended its expensive lobbying against abolition). They 
went soon after.
31  One reason is that no global consensus exists on what exactly should be regulated. for in-
stance, in Britain re-insurers are regulated by the FSA, but in their home markets only,  Munich Re 
and Swiss Re, the world’s largest reinsurance companies, are mostly unregulated. Non-fi nancial 
fi rms with big fi nancial operations do not fi t comfortably into the current regulatory framework 
anywhere. Enron, which has been plausibly described as an investment bank or hedge fund with an 
energy business on the side, was not regulated in America. In Britain, the fi rm itself was not regu-
lated, but its fi nancial subsidiaries were monitored by the FSA. There are big question marks over 
who regulates the growing number of fi rms now transforming themselves into fi nancial behemoths, 
modeled on GE with its huge GE Capital operation. Hedge funds and other highly leveraged institu-
tions are regulated lightly in most countries, and not at all in America. 
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with the economic cycle. Credit offi cers tend to lend too much in good times, 
heating up the economy, and then cut back too much in a downturn, making things 
worse. One way to get around this would be to require banks to set aside higher 
amounts of capital during economic booms than during recessions, to make risk-
taking less pro-cyclical. 32 If this was internationally required, it would be all the 
better. Initiatives in this regard should come from the regulators of the largest key 
players of the American markets.
This is not a new development by any measure.
Summary and Conclusion
A./ The two prime transmitters of competitive forces in the global economy 
are the multinational corporations and the international capital markets. They 
both show revealed systemic behavior with well defi ned goals and measurable 
effi ciency. For good global market performance, however, - among other things - 
we need effi cient markets (with respect to information processing), good rules, and, 
of course, determined, yet not over-ambitious regulators that have a powerful bite. 
In a global economic framework, however, as of yet, we do not seem to have any 
of these requirements met. National government choices, as well as multinational 
company and individual international investment decisions do remain largely 
within their “own” perceived boundaries, and without regard to any “globally 
defi ned” or desired goals. This present dichotomy of determining international 
economic events by large-country (e.g. USA, EU-27, Japan) preferences, but in 
fact domestic macro needs, and by fi rm-level multinational company preferences, 
is not likely to change soon. At the same time, there is increasing need to act 
and manage markets globally, and, as consequence there is a need to be ready to 
coordinate national policy actions, regulate multinational company behavior and 
32  How much capital fi nancial fi rms should set aside against risks going wrong is the trickiest 
decision international regulators have to make. Since 1988, big banks have been abiding by the 
Basel capital regime, which links the amount of capital they have to hold in reserve to  the  overall 
risk of the loans they make. Basel-2, a more sophisticated version of risk-based capital rules, is now 
under way. It is meant to apply not only to big banks but to all banks worldwide, and to all invest-
ment fi rms in the EU. There is also talk of an insurance Basel before long. But Basel-3 has met 
with considerable opposition, partly because it is too complicated, partly because some countries 
disagree over how much capital should be set aside against some sorts of loans. Germany wants a 
lower capital requirement for loans to small businesses, for example, because bank loans are their 
traditional source of funding.
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agree on some commonly shared safety rules of international fi nancial markets. 
These global coordination efforts can be looked at as contributions to the provision 
of global economic stability, which is a valuable public good. 
B./ As a general rule, competing fi rms, domestic and international alike, do 
learn from their past mistakes and constantly adapt to change.  We have reasoned 
that governments and regulators learn, too. True, they learn slowly, but they do 
learn. In this perspective, there is an evolution of concepts and proper policy actions 
as a function of a constantly changing global economic environment. Although the 
macro economy is not self-correcting, it has a learning capacity. At least, that is the 
impression one gets from the American experience of interactions between markets 
and government of the last two decades. In the American economy, overall, we 
argued that despite the recent dramatic weakness of the stock market, and despite the 
corporate scandals, the resilience of its fi nancial system and the attractiveness of its 
domestic markets in the eye of foreign investors has not diminished dramatically. 
This surprising loyalty can be accredited in no small measure to the mostly proper 
economic policy measures taken, or, - if you like - to the trusted values of the 
American market mechanisms in general.
C./ Based on the international  debt  history of the U.S. economy, we suggested 
that for a more even and sustainable future growth-pattern for the world economy, 
a higher U.S. savings rate and a higher Japanese and euro-area consumption rate 
would be benefi cial. This is by no means is a novelty, but it can be considered as a 
very pressing global issue to be (re)addressed soon.
D./ Neither the IT revolution nor globalization have managed to delete, let 
alone iron out unwanted recessionary business cycles.  In addition, we argued that 
Central banks should constantly monitor the wealth effects too, not just infl ation. 
This has been a recent lesson to be (re) learned. Thus, we stressed that the useful 
elements of anti-cyclical government interference should be kept. What is more, 
ongoing intergovernmental efforts are needed to sustain global demand.
E./ Recent capital market developments have confi rmed that there is also a 
need to overseeing the global impacts of international capital movements. The 
need for some globally co-ordinated supervision of international capital mobility 
is warranted if it is to match the accelerated intra-company cross border fl ows of 
funds with some regulation, to prevent the hiding of unwanted risk internationally. 
The trouble with today’s global pool of capital is that regulators may be out of 
their “depth”, i.e. jurisdiction. In this sense, there is an obvious need for some kind 
of global regulation that increases global safety standards of managing risks that 
are being spread over numerous international participants. Unlike domestic capital 
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markets, global markets have no desire and means to self-police, not to mention a 
strong formal supervision.
But certain things do not change, as it was put by former FED chairman Alan 
Greenspan(2003) in one of his famous statements: 
“…there is no tool to change human nature. Too often people are prone to
recurring bouts of optimism and pessimism that manifest themselves from
time to time in the build-up or cessation of speculative excesses.”
When exactly the build up collapses, well that is very hard to tell and forecast, 
so the Rajan (2010) statement sounds as a realistic tune: 
“The credit crisis was certainly not one of those “forecastable” events. If 
we ask why economists failed to predict the credit crisis, we should also ask why 
political scientists failed to predict the recent Arab Spring, or a terrorist event like 
9/11, or why seismologists cannot predict earthquakes.”
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